United States Courts and Imperialism by Moore, David H.
Washington and Lee Law Review Online 
Volume 73 Issue 1 Article 13 
8-15-2016 
United States Courts and Imperialism 
David H. Moore 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David H. Moore, United States Courts and Imperialism, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 338 (2016), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol73/iss1/13 
This Response is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review Online by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
338 
United States Courts and Imperialism 
David H. Moore* 
Abstract 
When U.S. Courts adjudicate transnational matters, they risk 
two forms of judicial imperialism. The first—unilateral 
imperialism—involves adjudication by a single state at the 
expense of multilateral forms of resolution or global governance. 
The second—sovereigntist imperialism—threatens the sovereignty 
of other states who might wish to resolve the controversy 
themselves. The risk of imperialism may lead U.S. courts to 
hesitate to adjudicate transnational claims. In Foreign 
Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the Case Against 
“Judicial Imperialism,” Professor Hannah Buxbaum highlights 
that in addition to facing involuntary adjudication in U.S. courts, 
foreign states voluntarily sue in U.S. courts as well. The 
phenomenon of foreign states as plaintiffs, she argues, undermines 
concerns for imperialism and counsels in favor of U.S. judicial 
resolution of transnational matters. 
Buxbaum’s focus on foreign states as plaintiffs is an 
important contribution. The implications of the focus, however, 
are more circumscribed than her article might suggest. The fact 
that foreign states occasionally sue in U.S. courts means that 
adjudication of transnational claims by U.S. courts does not 
always constitute unilateral imperialism. Rather, suits by foreign 
states may be a form of global governance. When it comes to 
concerns for sovereigntist imperialism, by contrast, foreign 
invocation of U.S. jurisdiction fails to undermine the sovereignty 
concerns that arise when U.S. courts adjudicate against the will of 
foreign states. First, the typical claims foreign states assert as 
plaintiffs themselves show respect for sovereignty. Second, consent 
matters, and in nonconsensual cases sovereignty concerns 
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continue to exist. Third, notions of reciprocity do not automatically 
justify involuntary adjudication due to foreign state invocation of 
U.S. jurisdiction. More is needed to conclude that the phenomenon 
of foreign states as plaintiffs justifies adjudication against the will 
of those states. 
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Resolution of transnational controversies in U.S. courts risks 
two forms of judicial imperialism. First, adjudication of 
transnational controversies in the courts of one country—the 
United States—threatens unilateral rather than multilateral 
governance of transnational matters. This unilateral imperialism 
elevates governance by a single state over multilateral 
approaches to governance. Second, the exercise of U.S. 
sovereignty to resolve transnational controversies threatens the 
sovereignty of other states that share ties to a controversy and 
might wish to exercise their sovereignty to resolve the 
controversy themselves. This sovereigntist imperialism elevates 
the sovereignty of one state over that of others.1 The risk of either 
form of imperialism, but especially the sovereigntist version, may 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Both forms of imperialism are international in nature. That is, both 
focus on the international impacts of U.S. adjudication, whether for global 
governance or for the co-equal sovereignty of other states. Judicial resolution of 
transnational matters might also present a domestic form of imperialism as 
courts exercise authority reserved to the political branches. Buxbaum makes 
brief reference to this form of imperialism, but focuses on international 
imperialism. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in 
U.S. Courts and the Case Against “Judicial Imperialism”, 73 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 653, 705–06 (2016) (noting separation of powers concerns arising from 
judicial resolution of transnational matters). This response maintains that focus 
as well.  
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lead U.S. courts to hesitate to resolve transnational matters like 
domestic matters by, for example, invoking the political question 
or act of state doctrine or applying a strong presumption against 
extraterritoriality. In Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. 
Courts and the Case Against “Judicial Imperialism,”2 Professor 
Hannah Buxbaum explores the phenomenon of foreign states 
bringing suit in U.S. courts to argue that charges of judicial 
imperialism leveled at U.S. courts are overblown such that U.S. 
courts should be more receptive to transnational litigation. 
Buxbaum makes an important contribution. Notions of 
judicial imperialism are predominately informed by a 
paradigmatic scenario in which U.S. courts exercise jurisdiction 
against the actual or presumed will of other states. Against this 
paradigm, Buxbaum reminds that other states also invoke the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The engagement of foreign states with 
U.S. courts is thus broader than the paradigmatic case intimates. 
This is an important insight. Yet the implications of this insight 
are more limited than Buxbaum suggests, especially when it 
comes to the sovereigntist brand of judicial imperialism. 
I. Relative Frequency 
As an initial matter, claims by foreign states as plaintiffs 
“constitute a small percentage of all litigation involving foreign 
sovereign parties.”3 Indeed, searching the Westlaw “cases” 
database (which includes cases that predate the Founding) as 
well as the “trial court documents” database (which generally 
contains only documents from 2000 onward), Buxbaum finds 
fewer than 300 claims by foreign states in U.S. courts.4 The more 
common contexts in which foreign states engage with U.S. courts 
are “(1) when a foreign government is the defendant in a U.S. 
court . . . ; (2) when a claim requires a U.S. court to scrutinize 
                                                                                                     
 2. While Buxbaum speaks of suits by foreign governments, I find it more 
natural to speak in terms of suits by foreign states, although such suits will be 
brought by the recognized governments of those states. 
 3.  Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 659. This is due in part to limitations on 
foreign state standing to sue in U.S. courts. See id. at 659–65.  
 4.  See id. at 653–54, 666 (discussing these Westlaw findings). Buxbaum 
explains that “these data are necessarily incomplete,” but represent “as full a 
set as possible of claims brought by foreign governments.” Id. at 666. 
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actions taken by a foreign government within its own 
borders . . . ; and (3) when a U.S. court seeks to apply U.S. law to 
persons or conduct within a foreign government’s borders . . . .”5 
In all these cases, the risk of a U.S. court infringing on the 
sovereignty of a foreign state or engaging in unilateral rather 
than multilateral resolution of the dispute is real.  
The risk may be reduced if foreign states accept U.S. 
adjudication in these cases. In all three of the more common 
contexts in which foreign states interact with the U.S. judiciary, 
foreign states may accede to U.S. adjudication. For example, 
when a foreign state appears as a defendant in U.S. courts, the 
state may waive its immunity.6 Similarly, a state may consent to 
the application of U.S. law to actors and events within its 
borders.7 The incentives that may lead a state to waive immunity 
or consent to U.S. exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction may differ 
from the incentives that lead a state to sue in U.S. courts. A state 
might waive jurisdictional immunity, for example, long before a 
suit materializes in order to secure a favorable business deal. Yet 
these situations are also relevant to an assessment of foreign 
states’ comfort with U.S. adjudication. In this regard, Foreign 
Governments as Plaintiffs provides an insightful starting point 
for a broader analysis of the ways in which foreign states 
welcome the involvement of U.S. courts in transnational 
matters.8  
II. Respect for Sovereignty When Foreign States Sue as Plaintiffs 
When it comes to the cases in which foreign states sue as 
plaintiffs, these cases reflect concern for sovereignty. Foreign 
                                                                                                     
 5.  Id.at 655 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 6.  See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (“A 
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or of the States in any case . . . in which the foreign state has waived its 
immunity either explicitly or by implication . . . .”). 
 7.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. k (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016). 
 8.  See Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 659 (noting additional situations in 
which foreign states consent to U.S. adjudication, while focusing on the 
phenomenon of foreign states as plaintiffs). 
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states bring roughly five types of claims in U.S. courts.9 Three 
types—“[c]laims related to assets located within the territory of 
the United States,”10 “[c]laims for monetary relief in connection 
with commercial activity in the United States or involving U.S. 
counterparties,”11 and “[r]equests for judicial assistance in 
connection with foreign judicial or arbitral proceedings”12—echo 
the international law rule that states have sovereign authority to 
regulate “persons, property, and conduct within [their] 
territory.”13 Whether or not these claims directly present 
questions of U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe, lodging these claims in 
U.S. courts demonstrates respect for the sovereignty of the 
United States over its territory and people. Similarly, requests to 
support foreign arbitral or judicial proceedings generally rely on 
treaties to which the United States has consented or statutes the 
United States has enacted in its sovereign discretion.14 These 
requests often ask the United States to perform tasks that would 
be an infringement of sovereignty for another state to attempt 
within U.S. territory, such as gather evidence.15  
A fourth (and relatively uncommon) type of claim—“[c]laims 
for injunctive relief following alleged treaty violations by a U.S. 
municipality or state, or by the federal government”16—also 
demonstrates respect for U.S. sovereignty. As with claims to 
support foreign proceedings, these claims rely on treaties to 
which the United States has consented. Bringing these claims in 
U.S. courts allows the United States, rather than a foreign or 
even international tribunal, to assess the legality of U.S. conduct 
and alter its ways. The fifth set of claims—“[c]laims for monetary 
relief for damages suffered in connection with unlawful conduct 
occurring within the foreign state”—invites the United States to 
                                                                                                     
 9.  Id. at 666–67. 
 10.  Id. at 666. Some of these claims extend to property located outside the 
United States and thereby reach beyond invocation of U.S. territorial 
sovereignty. Id. at 669.  
 11.  Id. at 666. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 212 (Tentative Draft 2, 2016). 
 14.  Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 670–71, 677. 
 15.  Id. at 670–71.  
 16.  Id. at 666, 673. 
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exercise sovereign power in situations where it otherwise might 
not, such as where foreign defendants acted within the territory 
of the suing state.17 To the extent that these claims seek 
enforcement of U.S. law,18 they are consistent with the 
international law principle that a state may exercise its 
sovereignty to consent to the application of another state’s law 
beyond what international law would otherwise allow.19 
In short, respect for sovereignty is evident in the five 
categories of claims that foreign states pursue as plaintiffs in 
U.S. courts.20 Consequently, the fact that foreign states invoke 
U.S. jurisdiction may, on balance, strengthen rather than 
undermine concerns for sovereigntist imperialism. 
III. Invocation Versus Imposition 
At a minimum, foreign states’ occasional invocation of U.S. 
jurisdiction has little or no direct bearing on concerns for 
sovereigntist imperialism. The same is not true when it comes to 
concerns for unilateral imperialism. Consensual interactions 
between foreign states and U.S. courts reveal—as Buxbaum 
usefully highlights in the context of foreign states as plaintiffs—
that what might at first blush appear to be unilateralism is in 
fact multilateral use of U.S. courts. In this way, Buxbaum’s focus 
on foreign states as plaintiffs shows that U.S. adjudication of 
transnational claims is not always unilateral imperialism but 
global governance. Yet this insight is qualified. As Buxbaum 
notes, developing states may resort to U.S. courts because they 
                                                                                                     
 17.  Id. at 667, 675–77. Buxbaum includes in this fifth set claims against 
U.S. corporations, id. at 675–76, a form of suit discussed previously. See supra 
text accompanying note 11. 
 18.  See Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 675 (noting that “some [foreign states] 
assert claims pursuant to foreign law, while others are brought under U.S. 
law[,] including various forms of regulatory law”). 
 19.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. k (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016). 
 20.  This does not mean that the United States always exercises its 
sovereignty to assist foreign states with their claims. Even when foreign states 
seek U.S. adjudication, U.S. courts may decline to oblige, including based on 
imperialism concerns. See Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 696–98 (discussing 
situations in which U.S. courts have refused to adjudicate claims by foreign 
state plaintiffs).  
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lack the ability to resolve transnational matters on their own.21 
Theirs is not so much an attempt to promote multilateral 
governance but to find a substitute unilateralism.  
The focus on foreign states as plaintiffs has less force when it 
comes to illuminating (or undermining, as Buxbaum hopes) 
concerns over sovereigntist imperialism. Consent is critical in 
identifying whether U.S. adjudication is a form of sovereigntist 
imperialism.22 Consensual adjudication does not infringe on 
another state’s sovereignty. At the same time, the existence of 
consensual adjudication does not automatically alter the 
imperialistic nature of nonconsensual adjudication.23 
Consider an analogy from the use of force. In 1781, a French 
naval fleet dispelled a British fleet and blockaded the 
Chesapeake Bay, pressuring Lord Cornwallis to surrender at 
Yorktown and precipitating British recognition of the United 
States as an independent sovereign.24 Less than two decades 
later, the French navy and French privateers seized American 
vessels in an undeclared quasi war with the United States.25 In 
both the Revolutionary War and the Quasi War with France, the 
United States engaged with French naval power. Yet in the 
                                                                                                     
 21.  See id. at 696 (“Many of the claims by developing countries [in U.S. 
courts] . . . suggest the need to supplement local resources in various ways.“). 
 22.  See id. at 714 & n.264 (noting the importance of consent in 
determining whether U.S. adjudication threatens foreign sovereignty).  
 23.  Buxbaum’s suggestion that consensual adjudication should reduce 
concerns for nonconsensual adjudication is strongest in the context of “claims in 
which foreign governments seek remedies such as treble damages and punitive 
damages that they have, in other contexts, criticized as violating their own 
public policies.” Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 678. Yet the implications of this rare 
opportunistic behavior are uncertain. The most sovereignty-respecting response 
would be to allow foreign states to pursue remedies to which they object when 
imposed involuntarily. More reasonably, U.S. courts might refuse to grant the 
remedies foreign states seek rather than conclude that foreign state pursuit of 
the remedies justifies their award against the will of foreign states in other 
suits. 
 24.  See, e.g., CHARLES LEE LEWIS, ADMIRAL DEGRASSE AND AMERICAN 
INDEPENDENCE xi, 201–02 (2014) (discussing the significance of the French naval 
victory and of the Battle of Yorktown); RICHARD M. KETCHUM, VICTORY AT 
YORKTOWN 214, 238–40 (2004) (discussing Cornwallis’s surrender in response to 
the siege from the army on land and French Navy at sea). 
 25.  See, e.g., Douglad Kroll, Quasi War, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF MILITARY HISTORY 1069 (James C. Bradford ed., 2006) (discussing French 
actions against the U.S. during the Quasi War). 
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Revolutionary War, the engagement was invited; in the Quasi 
War, the engagement was imposed. In the Revolutionary War, 
France came to the aid of U.S. sovereignty; in the Quasi War, 
France interfered with U.S. sovereignty.  
Foreign states’ engagement with U.S. judicial power is 
similar. Sometimes foreign states invoke U.S. judicial power to 
assist them in disputes with the United States or other entities. 
More frequently, foreign states involuntarily face U.S. 
adjudication. In both situations, foreign states engage with U.S. 
judicial power. But the fact that both scenarios involve 
interaction with U.S. judicial power does not mean that they 
reflect on foreign state sovereignty in the same way. One scenario 
occurs by invitation, the other by imposition. One respects 
sovereignty; the other diminishes sovereignty. Just as the fact 
that an invitation to France to use naval power to aid the United 
States does not lessen the aggressiveness of subsequent French 
plundering of U.S. vessels, the invocation of U.S. judicial power 
by foreign states does not lessen the threat to sovereignty posed 
by involuntary exercise of U.S. judicial power over foreign states. 
IV. Reciprocity and its Limits 
The threat to sovereignty presented by involuntary 
adjudication might be justified by notions of reciprocity, but that 
conclusion does not flow inevitably from the observation that 
foreign states sometimes invite U.S. adjudication. Reciprocity is a 
nuanced principle. For instance, reciprocity may justify burdens 
only when a certain threshold of benefits is received. Or 
reciprocity may have to bow to other values. The Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), for example, eliminates foreign 
states’ immunity when the foreign state sues as plaintiff, but only 
in that particular suit and only as to counterclaims that are 
transactionally related to the claims of the foreign state, seek 
remedies that are not different in form or amount from what the 
foreign state seeks, or would qualify for an exception to immunity 
under some other provision of the FSIA.26Similarly, whether or 
                                                                                                     
 26.  28 U.S.C. § 1607(a)–(c). The relevant portion of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act reads, 
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state 
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not the Due Process Clause applies to foreign states, the Clause 
protects a defendant to whom it applies from expansive 
assertions of personal jurisdiction even if the defendant has 
invoked the power of U.S. courts as a plaintiff in other cases.27 As 
these examples illustrate, receipt of judicial benefits does not 
necessarily justify judicial burdens. Consistent with this 
principle, the fact that foreign states sometimes invoke U.S. 
jurisdiction as plaintiffs does not immediately justify U.S. 
adjudication against the will of those states. More is needed to 
conclude that the sovereignty concerns that accompany 
involuntary adjudication are warranted by foreign states’ 
occasional invocation of U.S. jurisdiction. Foreign Governments as 
Plaintiffs stops short of providing that additional justification. 
V. Conclusion 
At the end of the day, Buxbaum exposes an important 
dimension of foreign state engagement with U.S. courts—foreign 
states’ voluntary invocation of U.S. jurisdiction as plaintiffs. The 
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction in such cases, it turns out, may be a 
form of global governance rather than unilateral imperialism. 
When it comes to concerns for sovereigntist imperialism, 
however, foreign invocation of U.S. jurisdiction fails to undermine 
the sovereignty concerns that arise when U.S. courts adjudicate 
contrary to the will of foreign states. In those cases, sovereignty 
concerns, absent more, continue to counsel against U.S. 
adjudication of transnational matters.  
 
 
                                                                                                     
intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign 
state shall not be accorded immunity with respect to any 
counterclaim . . . for which a foreign state would not be entitled to 
immunity under section 1605 or 1605A of this chapter had such claim 
been brought in a separate action against the foreign state; 
or . . . arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the claim of the foreign state; or . . . to the extent that the 
counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount or differing in 
kind from that sought by the foreign state. 
Id. 
 27.  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
